Does a dramatic drop in crime lead to an increase in property values? To date, the literature on how crime influences property values has focused solely within a single metropolitan area and has been limited primarily to cross-sectional analysis. In this study we exploit the dramatic, nationwide decrease in crime that occurred in the 1990s to examine the relationship between changes in crime rates and property values. To do this, we compile information on changes in property values and crime during the 1990s in nearly 3,000 urban zip codes throughout the U.S. Using a fixed-effects framework as well as an instrumental variables strategy, our analysis implies a large and statistically significant association between crime and property values. The estimated elasticities of property values with respect to crime range from -0.15 to -0.35. Furthermore, zip codes in the top decile in terms of crime reduction saw property value increases of 7-19% during the 1990s. Both the empirical analysis and a graphical analysis suggest that causality runs from decreasing crime to increasing property values. These results imply that the crime drop was a major contributor to the recent resurgence of cities.
Introduction
Crime has traditionally been one of the great challenges facing urban areas in the United States. The direct and indirect costs of crime are tremendous. Anderson (1999) estimates that the net annual burden of crime exceeds one trillion dollars in the U.S.
Direct costs include destruction of life, destruction of property, expenditures on criminal justice programs, and expenditures on private security. Indirect costs of crime include the opportunity costs of victims, criminals and prisoners, but also the fear and anxiety that salient criminal acts such as murders, vandalism, open-air drug dealing, loitering by gang members, and prostitution can impose on neighborhoods. Overall, crime can be viewed as a neighborhood disamenity. One market that captures some of these neighborhood crime disamenities is the housing market.
During the 1990s, crime dropped dramatically throughout the United States. For example, homicide rates fell by 43 percent and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) violent and property crime indexes fell by 34 and 29 percent respectively (Levitt (2004) ). The largest improvements in crime occurred in metropolitan areas, especially in large cities. This dramatic crime drop came as a surprise. Levitt (2004) documents how leading experts were actually predicting an increase in crime even after the crime drop had begun. However, the socioeconomic fundamentals that were thought to drive crime were relatively stable over this same time period. This led Zimring (2007) to conclude his analysis of the 1990s crime drop by saying -Whatever else is now known about crime in America, the most important lesson of the 1990s was that major changes in rates of crime can happen without major changes in the social fabric (p. 206) .‖ This paper exploits the unique crime drop that occurred in the 1990s to examine the link between crime and property values. From a research perspective one would like to conduct an experiment that adjusts crime rates across the U.S. to establish the causal impact of crime on property values. Although this ideal experiment is obviously impossible to conduct, certain features of the 1990s crime drop make it a type of natural experiment. These features include that the drop was large and unexpected, there was substantial variation in crime decreases within and across metropolitan areas, and the socioeconomic backdrop during this time period was not changing dramatically. Because this natural experiment takes place across the entire United States, we conform our analysis to a national setting. This allows us to take a much broader perspective on the relationship between crime and property values than the existing literature on the topic.
Beginning with Thaler (1978) , this small literature has focused solely within a single metropolitan area and has typically relied on cross-sectional variation in crime and property values to obtain an estimate of some of the indirect costs of crime.
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Perhaps one of the reasons why no one has previously examined the relationship between crime and property values on a national scale is the difficulty associated with acquiring localized crime measures and corresponding information on housing prices throughout the United States. Furthermore, one must not only have crime and housing data at a local-level to exploit the crime drop that occurred in the 1990s, one must also have this data over time. In this project we have overcome this difficulty by compiling a comprehensive dataset of crime, property values, and socioeconomic characteristics from 1990 to 2000 at the zip code-level in nearly three thousand urban zip codes throughout the United States. The crime data comes from a combination of a commercial vendor's zip code-level estimates of crime and the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. The housing data is also acquired from a commercial vendor who provides home price indices at the zip code-level following the Case-Shiller (1987) methodology. These exceptional data allow us to fully exploit the natural experiment of the crime drop during the 1990s to examine the relationship between crime and property values across the U.S. While we argue that our results are more credible than cross-sectional evidence, it is still primarily a correlational analysis. In an effort to distinguish between correlation and causation we take two additional steps in our investigation. First, we exploit annual housing value data to present a graphical analysis of the residuals from the regressions.
These residuals are broken out by the quartiles of the 1990 violent and property crime levels. The temporal movement of housing price changes illustrated in this graphical analysis is consistent with the national trend in crime and suggests that our results are not explained by differences in pre-treatment trends. Second, we provide results from an instrumental variable (IV) procedure. We instrument changes in crime that took place in each zip code with a measure of the amount of crime that we would have expected to have taken place in that zip code based on the national crime trend. Specifically, we match each zip code to a zip code in another MSA with similar 1990 crime levels. This procedure eliminates zip code-specific changes in crime that took place over this time period (which are likely to be endogenous) by focusing solely on crime changes that were predicted by the national trend. In a first stage we can show that changes in the levels and percent of both violent and property crime that occurred between matched zip codes, are highly correlated even when including MSA fixed effects and the zip code-level controls. Our IV estimates are greater than or equal to the OLS results suggesting that the correlational results, if anything, may understate the true causal impact of crime rates on property values.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides additional detail on the 1990s crime drop. Section 3 describes our unique dataset that allows us to examine the crime and property value relationship. In section 4, we describe our empirical methodology and in section 5, we present the results. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
The 1990s Crime Drop
The drop in crime rates that occurred between 1993 and 2000 in the United States was historically unique. It provides a type of natural crime experiment that allows for an examination of the link between crime and property values. The crime drop was exceptional in several ways. First, the decrease in crime was large and swift. Second, the crime drop was unexpected. Third, the decrease in crime was largely unrelated to the underlying socioeconomic fundamentals that have been thought to be the drivers of crime fluctuations. In this section, we provide additional details on these unique aspects of the 1990s crime drop as background to our analysis on the link between crime and property values.
Size and Timing of the Crime Drop
The drop in crime rates from about 1993 to 2000 was dramatic. It was by far the largest and swiftest decrease in crime since modern record keeping of crime rates began in the United States. Documenting this crime drop relies on data from various sources that categorize crime in different ways. Crime comes in many different flavors.
However, most research focused on national trends in crime has delineated crime into three categories: (i) homicides, (ii) violent crime other than homicides, and (iii) property crime. Here we graphically illustrate these three types of crime to provide the reader with a sense as to the size and timing of the crime drop.
The most reliable source of homicide information comes from the Vital Statistics System conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics (Wiersema, Loftin & McDowall 2000) . Information on homicides is collected around the U.S. by coroners and medical examiners during the course of their death investigations. Figure 1a shows the national trend in homicide rates per 10,000 people. As can be seen, homicides hovered at around 1 per 10,000 between 1975 and 1993 but then dropped to about .6 per 10,000 by the year 2000. Property crime as measured by the UCR dropped by about 24%.
3 The NCVS also calculates property crime rates but does it per household instead of per person. Since the number of households does not change at the same rate each year as the population, it makes the trends difficult to compare. 4 For example, the UCR defines burglary as -the unlawful entry or attempted entry of a structure to commit a felony or theft,‖ whereas the NCVS defines burglary as -the entry or attempted entry of a residence by a person who had no right to be there. This is because the NCVS which relies on surveys with victims does not want victims to determine criminal motives. Another difference between the UCR and the NCVS is that commercial property crimes are included in the UCR property crimes count but not in the NCVS. 5 A similar crime drop using the UCR measures for violent crimes can be shown as well.
Expectations about Crime Before the Drop
Given the swiftness of this drop and the magnitude, one would expect that crime experts would have foreseen the impending crime decrease in the early 1990s. This however was not the case. Levitt (2004) provides a nice discussion of the expectations that leading experts had in the early and middle part of the 1990s, about future crime trends. Most experts were predicting that crime would increase throughout the 1990s.
One leading expert who was commissioned by the U.S. attorney general to write a report on crime trends in 1995, projected that youth homicides would rise by between 15 and 100 percent over the following decade even though they actually declined by approximately 50 percent (see Levitt 2004 for further discussion). Levitt (2004) concludes, -the crime decline was so unanticipated that it was widely dismissed as temporary or illusory long after it had begun.‖ (p.170).
Relationship between the Crime Drop and Socioeconomic Fundamentals
Before the 1990s crime drop, conventional wisdom among criminologists and economists was that socioeconomic fundamentals largely drive crime changes. This notion was primarily based on cross-sectional evidence that linked crime to a variety of socioeconomic factors such as one-parent families, population instability, income inequality and the prevalence of racial minorities. 6 However, the 1990s crime drop appears to fly in the face of this conventional wisdom. Using the 200 largest U.S.
counties, Cook (2008) showed that the counties that improved in the socioeconomic characteristics that have been thought to drive crime were not much more likely to show drops in crime than other counties.
Cook (2008) concludes, -The 1990s experience -the large across-the-board reduction in crime without much progress in the socioeconomic fundamentals -is hopeful, in a way. It creates the possibility that crime rates can change dramatically, quite independently of changes in the fundamental socioeconomic conditions (p. 10).‖ In his comprehensive book on the subject, Zimring (2007) similarly concludes, -Whatever else is now known about crime in America, the most important lesson of the 1990s was that major changes in rates of crime can happen without major changes in the social fabric (p.206).‖ According to Zimring (2007) , the fact that Canada saw a similar crime drop without many of the factors that have been attributed to causing the crime drop in the U.S. occurring, means that many of the causes of the crime drop are still unclear.
While far from a perfect natural experiment, the size, timing, unexpectedness, and the relative stability of the -social fabric‖ within the United States help to make the 1990s crime drop a type of natural crime experiment useful for this study.
Data
One of the reasons why no one has previously examined the relationship between crime and property values on a national scale is the difficulty in acquiring localized crime measures and corresponding information on housing prices throughout the United States.
To overcome this difficulty we have compiled three datasets on crime, property values, and socioeconomic and demographic controls. Each of these datasets spans the 1990 to 2000 timeframe at the geographic scale of zip code. In this section, we describe each data type in preparation for our empirical analysis.
Crime Data
The two primary sources of data on national crime that have been used by researchers in the past are the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. As was described in section 2, the NCVS relies on a national survey of households and is only reported at the state and national levels. Therefore, it cannot be used to look at local crime rates. The UCR data, which collects information on crimes reported to law enforcement authorities, is reported at the scale of a law enforcement authority's jurisdiction. This can be as localized as a small rural town, or as large as an entire metropolitan city serviced by a single police department. The smallest geographic level by which the UCR is consistently reported is the county level.
For our analysis we want to exploit the variation in crime that occurs within counties over time. To do this we combine information from the UCR county-level data with a dataset purchased from CAP Index, Inc. to produce measures of crime changes in 1990 and 2000 at the zip code-level. CAP Index, Inc. specializes in providing objective measures of crime for specific sites and neighborhoods. 7 CAP Index combines data from a variety of sources including police reports, UCR data, client loss reports, and offender and victim surveys to create a -crime score,‖ for the same violent and property crime categories that are in the UCR at a local level. 8 CAP Index then provides a crime score index that ranges from 0 to 2000 with 100 being the average score in the United States.
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A difficulty with the CAP Index data from the perspective of our analysis is that comparing the crime scores across time is not straightforward. If the level of crime were reduced in all zip codes in the U.S. by the same amount over time, then the difference in the CAP Index crime scores over time would be zero. This is because the crime scores only provide relative information about zip code-level crime in the U.S. at one point in time (in our case the two points in time that we have are 1990 and 2000). Homebuyers and sellers may react not only to the changes in relative crime over time, but also to changes in the levels of crime over time.
We want a zip code-level measure of crime that reflects actual crime rates as opposed to a simple index that does not account for changes in crime over time. To do this, we aggregate the CAP Index scores, weighting each zip code by its population, to the county-level for violent crimes and property crimes. 10 We then regress UCR violent crimes and property crimes data separately on the corresponding CAP Index crime scores (and polynomials of the crime scores) for 1990 and 2000. The resulting -crime coefficients‖ provide a measure of the crime levels in the UCR data that can be explained by the CAP Index crime scores. Thus, the crime coefficients can be used to weight and aggregate the CAP Index crime scores to provide an estimate of the actual crime rate in 8 CAP Index can provide property specific information. See for example Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006) who use CAP Index, Inc. data in their analysis of bank mergers and crime. 9 As a check on the validity of the CAP Index data relative to the more standard UCR data, we aggregate the CAP Index data to the county level and correlate this with the UCR data. The correlation between the total crime counts in the UCR and the total crime index value from CAP Index is .44. 10 Although homicides are a good national barometer of crime, they are rare enough at a localized level that it is difficult to use homicides as a crime indicator on its own. Therefore, we follow the convention made by others studying crime (i.e. Cullen and Levitt 1999) and focus on total violent crimes (which includes homicides) and property crimes.
each zip code. provided for these coefficients suggest that the variation in the change in crime that occurred was substantial both between and within MSAs.
Property Value Data
The property value data used in our analysis is Fiserv's Case-Shiller Index (CSI), produced at the zip code level. These indices are estimated using arithmetic weighting of repeat sales (Shiller 1991) which is a variation of the Case and Shiller (1987) Table 1, we normalize the index such that each zip code has an index score of 100 in 1990. Between 1990 and 2000, the average increase in housing prices was about 45% with substantially more variation across MSAs relative to within MSAs. One of the advantages of this data 11 These percent decreases are smaller than the national decrease illustrated in Section 2. This is in large part due to the summary statistics giving equal weight to each zip code when calculating the mean crime reduction. Since, higher crime zip codes tend to have larger populations, the average over zip codes is mechanically smaller than the national average.
relative to median sales price measures of changes in housing values over time (i.e. selfreported housing values given in the decennial census), is that it is not affected by the mix of properties that are sold in a given time period. Furthermore, the indexes are not affected by differences in average housing quality across zip codes. The CSI is widely considered the most accurate measure of single-family home price changes in the areas that it covers. Surprisingly, the zip code-level indices have been rarely used in academic research, and to the best of our knowledge, the full set of available zip codes has never before been used in the economics literature. 
Control Variable Data
Although according to Cook (2008) , socioeconomic and sociodemographic fundamentals appear largely unrelated to the changes in crime that occurred throughout the 1990s, it still may be important to control for these factors since they may represent other urban societal shifts of importance that may have occurred over this time period.
For example, some urban areas have seen gentrification occur as more affluent individuals have moved into lower-class areas. However, by including demographic information on household income, race, age and education, and information on government reinvestment efforts in our regression models, the confounding effects of this type of gentrification can be controlled for in the analysis. Table 1 shows summary measures of the socioeconomic, demographic and Federal program variables used in our analysis and how they have changed over time.
Empirical Strategy

Hedonic Pricing Method
The hedonic pricing method has become an important tool used by economists to estimate household valuations for local amenities such as crime. Under this method, it is argued that economic agents choose a place of residence by making informed tradeoffs between housing characteristics and various local amenities. Housing values (a measure of revealed preference) are then used to isolate the -implicit price‖ of a particular housing attribute or neighborhood characteristic. Early applications of this technique included attempts to understand the value of air quality (e.g. Ridker and Henning (1967) ), the value of schools (e.g. Kain and Quigley (1970) ), and as referenced earlier, the value of crime (e.g. Thaler (1978) The most basic hedonic price specification that we employ takes the following form:
(1)
The change in the Case Shiller Index between 2000 and 1990 for each zip code i in MSA j is represented as a linear function of the change in crime rate (violent or property) that occurred in that zip code between 2000 and 1990, the change in a variety of control variables ( ij X  ), and a random error term. It is worth noting again that we do not need to control for physical housing characteristics because the Case Shiller Index is based on repeat sales for homes where physical housing characteristics are differenced away.
Critiques of Identification Strategy
There are several critiques of the identification strategy specified by Equation (1) that we are able to address. First, our analysis uses data across the US to identify the impact of crime on housing. The hedonic literature, however, suggests that housing markets are typically at the level of a city or smaller (see Palmquist (2005) for a discussion) suggesting that treating the country as one large housing market may be naïve. This is partially illustrated by the fact we described earlier about our data-that there is substantially more variation in property values across MSAs relative to within MSAs. Furthermore, MSA-level shocks may occur which differentially affect cities with high levels of crime relative to cities with low levels of crime. Fortunately, we have constructed a dataset with housing prices and crime at the zip code level. Thus, we have the luxury of exploiting within MSA variation. Given the importance of the MSA fixed effects in dealing with the concerns above and because they help us estimate the coefficients with much more precision, we focus on estimates that include the fixed effects.
A second critique involves the structure of the relationship between crime rate changes and housing values. As presented, this specification suggests that absolute changes in crime rates affect housing values. An alternative specification would allow for percent changes in crime rates to impact housing values. Our intuition is that using absolute changes is a more accurate model -a drop in the crime rate by 50% in a highcrime zip code in New York, for example, should have a larger impact on housing values in that zip code than a drop in the crime rate by 50% in a small town that had very little crime to begin with. However, we present results using both absolute and percent changes in crime rates for completeness.
Looking at equation (1), one might ask why we are doing a difference regression over a 10-year period rather than smaller time differences. While we have access to the Case Shiller Index annually, it bears repeating that we do not have yearly crime data at the zip-code level. Thus due to data limitations, we are unable to estimate the impact of year-to-year changes in crime rates on year-to-year changes in housing values. While our regression framework does not allow for an annual analysis, we provide graphical evidence in the next section that exploits the available, annual changes in house prices, to test for differences in pre-treatment trends, and explore how crime may affect housing prices from year-to-year. This graphical evidence helps to rule out the possibility that pre-crime trends are driving our result and help to establish the causal link between crime changes and property value changes.
A final critique of Equation (1) is that even with MSA fixed effects and the large drop in crime that occurred in the 1990s, this specification might still fail to identify a causal relationship between crime and property values due to omitted variable bias.
Without explicit randomization, we are not able to fully address this concern. However, we can improve upon simple OLS estimates. Equation (1) relies on two sources of variation in crime rate changes in order to identify the effect of crime on property values.
The first source of variation is a result of differential impacts that the national trend in crime during the 1990s had on zip-code level crime rates (the variation we want to exploit). However, mixed in with this variation are changes in crime rates that did not occur because of the national trend (variation we want to instrument out). For example, a handful of zip codes actually experienced an increase in crime rates through the 1990s.
The variation that comes from this type of crime rate change clearly has the potential to be endogenous and provides the motivation for an instrumental variables strategy.
Instrumental Variables Strategy
We propose an instrumental variables strategy that allows us to isolate the variation in crime rate changes that occurred due to the national drop in crime during the 1990s. The basic intuition for this identification is that while the crime decrease during the 1990s was largely ubiquitous, certain areas were particularly affected. Specifically, high-density areas with a large amount of crime at the start of the 1990s experienced a greater decrease in crime (both in absolute and percentage terms) than their counterparts.
For example, Levitt (2004) noted that the violent crime rates between 1991 and 2001 decreased by 36.7% within MSAs (where crime rates were initially higher) and by only 2.9% in rural areas. Thus, the drop in crime during the 1990s had a very heterogeneous effect across space.
In order to isolate the impact of the national trend on a given zip code, we instrument each zip code's crime rate change with the crime rate change that occurred over the same period for a -similar‖ zip code in a different MSA. For example, the crime decrease between 2000 and 1990 that occurred in a dense, high-crime zip code in New York can be instrumented with the crime drop that occurred in a zip code in Los Angeles with similar 1990 crime levels. Thus, variation in crime rate changes that were abnormal relative to other MSAs during the 1990s are not picked up by the instrument while changes that matched the general trend are. Removing this -abnormal‖ variation is advantageous since zip code-specific changes in crime rates (changes that did not match the national trend) has the potential to be endogenous. For example, one source of endogeneity that has been a concern in the crime literature is mismeasurement or misreporting of crimes by local jurisdictions who face political pressures to either increase or decrease the number or reported crimes (Baer and Chambliss, 1997) . 13 OLS estimates under this scenario would be biased downward. Our IV strategy on the other hand does not use the zip code-specific variation in crime changes that took place during the 1990s and instead only uses the variation that can be predicted by the national trend.
The exact instrumental variables method we perform is as follows. We execute a nearest-neighbor matching algorithm that identifies for each zip code, a zip code from a different MSA that is the closest match based on 1990 crime rates. This matching is a 13 Local police departments often have incentives to increase the reported number of crimes to support requests for more funding and or personnel. However, local police departments can also face political pressure to show that they are effectively decreasing crime. These competing crime reporting incentives are likely to be endogenous to business and political cycles that influence property values.
simplification of the type of matching that has frequently been used by researchers attempting to match observations from a treatment group with a control group in order to make causal inference (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder, 2001 ).
Our strategy is unique in that we use the nearest neighbor match to identify the out-of-MSA candidate to serve as an instrument zip code rather than as a control zip code. Once we obtain the match for each zip code, we instrument the change in crime that occurred in a zip code with the change in crime that occurred over the same time for its matched zip code. 14 While Equation (1) provides the simplest specification that we employ, the following equation (which includes MSA fixed effects and indicates the IV strategy) is the most detailed specification in the paper:
A natural question is whether we would expect our instrumental variables method to increase or decrease the estimates of crime on property values relative to simple OLS.
We would expect the results to be attenuated to the extent that the IV strategy eliminates endogenous crime reductions that were accompanied by zip-code specific improvements in neighborhood amenities. However, if a significant fraction of the changes in crime that occurred that did not follow the national pattern were a result of mismeasurement or misreporting of crimes, then we would expect OLS estimates to contain attenuation bias 14 Rather than matching solely on 1990 levels of crime, we could conceivably match zip codes on a host of 1990 census characteristics (e.g. percent black, percent unemployed, etc.). We choose to match only on 1990 crime levels for two key reasons. First, 1990 levels of crime predict better than any other variable changes in crime between . Thus, matching on other variables reduces the overall fit of the first stage. Second, matching on unemployment rates, population density, or other variables opens up the possibility of shocks that differentially affect certain types of zip codes to bias our estimates. Using the more parsimonious matching algorithm reduces the number of potential shocks that might affect our results.
and the instrumental variables results should be larger. 15 The relative incidence of endogeneity and measurement error will determine the relative size of the OLS and IV estimates.
The instrumental variables strategy as outlined above is not without flaws. Given that the identification is based on an event-study-like methodology, a key assumption is that a shock did not occur around 1994 that differentially affected high and low crime areas. While we attempt to control for several potential shocks (unemployment rate changes, empowerment and renewal community zones, etc.) the absence of an unobservable shock is a necessary condition for unbiased estimation. 
Results
Correlations and OLS Results
Figures 2a rely exclusively on within-MSA variation, using the same axis scales. As can be seen 15 See for example the discussion of the tradeoff between endogenity and measurement error in the returnsto-education literature (Card, 2001) . 16 One might argue that the economics literature has provided several potentially exogenous instruments for that could be used such as lead reduction (Reyes, 2007) , abortion laws (Donohue and Levitt, 2001) , or drug busts (Dobkin and Nicosia, forthcoming) . However, all of these studies provide potentially exogenous crime variation at the state-level or higher. As will be shown in the results section, because of the large changes that take place in housing prices across states and MSAs, we are only able to identify an impact of crime changes on property values when looking within an MSA. Thus, only an instrument for crime that works within an MSA could provide appropriate identification.
from these figures, looking within each MSA dramatically reduces the amount of noise. Now a strong, negative relationship between the crime and property value changes can be seen which highlights the need for MSA fixed effects in our regression analysis.
A more rigorous analysis of the relationship between changes in crime and property values is presented in Table 2 . Panel A provides OLS regression estimates (see Equation (1)) of the impact of violent and property crime changes on changes in housing values. Columns (1) and (3) The specifications in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 2 include zip-code level controls in addition to MSA fixed effects. The coefficient on both violent crime changes and property crime changes in these specifications are even larger in absolute value (by approximately 30%). Also, Panel B of Table 2 provides an analogous analysis to Panel A, but tests the relationship between percent changes in violent and property crimes on changes in housing values. Once again, we find a negative relationship between crime and housing changes that becomes even stronger when including controls at the zip-code level. The coefficient in Column (2) can be interpreted as finding that a decrease in violent crime rates by 10% results in an increase in property values by 1.5%.
Dynamics of Housing Price Changes
Using the annual Case Shiller housing data, we are able to provide a more complete picture of the results presented in Figure 2 and Table 2 Thus this graphical evidence suggests that the result we find in Table 2 are not explained by differences in pre-treatment trends and is likely causal.
IV Results
We use an instrumental variable strategy discussed in section 4.3 to estimate the impact of crime changes that are solely a result of the national trend on changes in housing values. Table 3 provides the first stage results by regressing the change in crime that occurred between 1990 and 2000 for a given zip code on the change in crime that occurred in the zip code from a different matched MSA, which matching was based on 1990 crime levels. As expected, changes in crime that occurred between matched zip codes are highly correlated due to the national drop in crime. This is true with both violent and property crime, percent and level changes, and when including MSA fixed effects and other controls. In fact, changes in crime that occurred in a matched zip code explain anywhere from 15% to 80% of the variation in crime decreases that we find suggesting that the instrument has ample statistical power. Table 4 with the OLS results from Table 2 . The IV coefficients on violent crime changes for both absolute levels and percent changes are 20-60% larger than the OLS coefficients. For property crimes, the IV coefficients are 0-10% larger. As discussed in the empirical strategy section, we attribute the increase in coefficient size to measurement error in the crime data. Using a similar interpretation of the coefficients, Column (2) of Table 4 suggests that a drop in violent crime by 100 per 10,000 people is associated with a 5.5% increase in housing values. For the 10% of zip codes with the largest violent crime reduction, we estimate that the effect of this reduction was a 12.1% increase in property values.
A Robustness Check
As mentioned in the empirical strategy section, the event-study research design that we employ in this paper requires that no other important, uncontrolled shock, occurred around 1994 that differentially affected high and low crime zip codes. The graphical analysis that we present as well as the robustness of our results to the inclusion of various zip-code level controls helps to alleviate the concern of these types of endogenous findings. One worry, however, may be that changes took place in the 1990s that differentially affected zip codes with high housing values relative to zip codes with low housing values.
For example, evidence suggests that when overall housing prices increase, the distribution of housing prices also change -low-value houses increase in price by more than high-value houses (Case and Mayer, 1995) . We are interested in identifying the impact of a change in crime, not a trending result based on changes in the distribution of house prices. Table 5 provides analogous results to Table 2 , while controlling for the 1990 median house price value in each zip code. 17 The coefficient on the 1990 median house value suggests that within MSAs, homes that had higher 1990 house values actually increased in value over the 1990s. More importantly for this analysis, we find only minor changes to the estimates of the effect of crime on housing values after adding the additional control.
Conclusions
This paper examines the link between crime and property values. Exploiting the dramatic, nationwide decrease in crime that occurred in the 1990s, we estimate a significant negative relationship between changes in crime rates and property values. both violent and property crimes, and for whether we use changes in the levels or changes in the percent of crime as our measure of crime change. The graphical analysis of the residuals and the similarity of the IV results suggest that causality runs from decreasing crime to increasing property values.
Using the 1990 decennial census we calculate the average property values for the nearly 3000 zip codes used in our analysis as well as the average property values in the zip codes that are in the top decile of violent and property crime. 18 Using these 1990
average property values as well as the average decline in violent crime across zip codes (approximately 30), we estimate that the crime decrease translated into an average gain of around $2,000 per house. However, in the top decile of zip codes in terms of violent crime, the average violent crime decrease was around 209. Our estimates suggest that in these zip codes, the housing price gain from decreased crime was closer to $11,000 for each house. The average price gains were even larger when calculated looking at changes in property crime. These estimates would suggest per house property value gains of between $11,000 for all zip codes and between $20,000 and $27,000 for houses in the top decile of property crime.
The analysis presented in this paper is the first attempt to estimate the impact of crime on housing values at the national level. This paper also contributes to the literature on the rise and fall of urban areas and cities. 19 Urban areas have for many years been in decline. However, during the 1990's many urban areas have staged a comeback.
Policymakers and city officials are keenly interested in the reasons for this resurgence. 18 Average housing values in all 2922 zip codes is approximately $160,000, in the 292 zip codes in the top decile for violent crime it is approximately $122,000, and the 292 zip codes in the top decile for property crime average housing values are approximately $144,000. 19 See for example Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) and Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006) .
One factor that has been hypothesized to have contributed to the recent resurgence of urban areas was the dramatic drop in crime during the 1990's that occurred in these urban areas. The results in this paper lend support to this theory by documenting the relationship between crime and property values. Thus this work supports the view that policymakers and city officials concerned with urban growth should make crime prevention an important priority. Additional work on the relationship between city efforts to reduce crime, the role of specific crimes on property values and the magnitude of other externalities stemming from crime and its influence on property values represent exciting avenues for future research.
